- connect-src: allow the GlitchTip domain itself so the SDK can report events
- media-src: allow Mux's edge CDN (*.edgemv.mux.com) for HLS manifests
- img-src: allow blob: for client-side upload previews
- pass SENTRY_ORG/SENTRY_PROJECT/SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN as Docker build args so
withSentryConfig can upload readable source maps during `npm run build`
Rate-limiting on messages.send, reports.create, reactions.toggle,
follows.create, reposts.create. Unique constraints on Report to stop
report-flooding. Mux webhook now fails hard in production without a
signing secret instead of skipping verification. Admin-panel outline
buttons fixed on 4 more pages (same white-on-dark bug as the Users page).
Timing-safe comparison for ADMIN_SECRET/CRON_SECRET. Fixed duplicate HSTS
header (Cloudflare's stronger one was being shadowed by the app's own).
tRPC now returns clean JSON 401s instead of HTML redirects when
unauthenticated, and no longer blocks public procedures for logged-out
visitors. 14 previously-silent catch blocks now log to GlitchTip.
invite/page.tsx and EmergencyVetSection.tsx fully localized (were 100%
hardcoded German). Stale TODO comments removed, auth.test.ts scaffold
rewritten to match the actual lazy-upsert pattern instead of a Clerk
webhook flow that was never built.
Replaces the dead hand-rolled buildCsp() draft in next.config.ts (never
wired in — its script-src had no 'unsafe-inline'/nonce, which blocked
Next.js's own hydration script and blanked the whole app when tested
live on 2026-08-10) with Clerk's official contentSecurityPolicy option
on clerkMiddleware(). This is Clerk's documented workaround: its default
directives already include the permissive script-src Next.js App Router
needs, merged with our app-specific img-src/connect-src/media-src/
font-src/frame-ancestors/object-src/base-uri additions (Supabase, Mux,
litix).
Ships as Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only (reportOnly: true) with
both reporting mechanisms wired to a new /api/csp-report route handler:
Clerk's reportTo (Reporting API) and a classic report-uri (for browsers
without Reporting API support). The route normalizes both report shapes,
rate-limits by IP, and forwards violations to Sentry/GlitchTip as
warnings — never blocks the request.
Deliberately NOT enforced yet — move to reportOnly: false only after a
clean observation period with zero unexpected violations.
Gitea #5
/ unconditionally redirected to /feed, gated entirely by proxy.ts's
auth.protect() — so logged-out visitors AND social-media crawlers
scraping og:image for link previews got bounced to Clerk's hosted
sign-in before Next.js ever rendered this route's metadata (surfaced
as Facebook Sharing Debugger's "og:image should be explicit" warning,
since the crawler never saw our actual tags).
Adds "/" to proxy.ts's public matcher and moves the
authenticated-redirect into the page itself via a plain auth() read
(not .protect()), so it can render a real hero page — matching the OG
image's warm gradient + paw-mark visual language — for logged-out
visitors and crawlers alike, while still bouncing authenticated users
straight to /feed as before.
Social-media crawlers (Facebook, Twitter/X, Slack, Discord) never
have a Clerk session, so the new OG image route was 307-redirecting
every one of them to /sign-in instead of serving the image — found
while live-testing right after deploy, same class of bug as the
GDPR-export route fix.
The Clerk route matcher was redirecting the new GDPR export download
link to /sign-in, breaking the pawfeed.org token flow just shipped —
found while live-testing the link right after deploy.
trim-feeds and anniversaries validate their own CRON_SECRET bearer
token, but Clerk's middleware ran auth.protect() first and 307-redirected
every request (including the cron caller) to sign-in before the route
handler's own check ever ran. Same pattern as /api/webhooks/(.*), which
also authenticates itself independently of Clerk.
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